Chrono24 Raises €21 Million of Venture Capital: My Thoughts

Over the weekend, Techcrunch reported that Chrono24 has raised €21 million. This is, of course, a staggering sum for a watch website. Recently we had the Hodinkee merger and raise where I commented that the $3.6 million was actually a very modest number and should allow them to continue to expand while keeping control of the company. Chrono24 has obviously decided on the opposite approach. While the post does not say at what valuation the money was raised, one can only imagine that nearly $23,000,000 bought a pretty large chunk of the company. For those less familiar with venture capital, it is important to realize that bigger is not always better. VC’s generally expect a return of 10x or more from an investment, so the ability to exit for a win gets incredibly difficult when you need a quarter billion dollar exit to make your investors happy. All of that being said, this does validate what I have been saying both privately and publicly for many years: there is a huge opportunity in online watch sales.

Chrono24 is primarily a marketplace for used watches. It would be nearly impossible to get accurate statistics on the size of this market, but it is certainly huge. I personally know many dealers who are making 7 figure incomes per year selling used watches, some with as little marketing as a monthly email blast. An area with a ton of transactions and often very high margins is the perfect place to start taking big bites. Chrono24 has become a big player in this area, but has by no means grabbed the market. As an occasional buyer and seller myself, I do not feel there is a great central marketplace. Market inefficiencies are the norm, sometimes to my advantage and sometimes not. There is a massive opportunity here though, and it can easily be expanded to other verticals once the right formula is found (men who like to buy and sell used watches generally like to buy and sell other things too).

The next huge market which is totally untapped is new online watch sales. The idea of a brick and mortar multi-brand retailer is so at-odds with the current times that it is almost beyond comprehension to think that no good alternative exists. Big brands are shifting sales mainly to boutiques, which makes sense but is really just a partial strategy. At some point, sales are going to have to move online as they have with every other product and will continue to do. Now, you are dealing with some of the most risk averse and least forward thinking companies on the planet when you talk about Swiss watch companies (as recently as 7 years ago, many still thought the internet was a fad), but they are not immune to the procession of time. Ultimately, someone will crack the code of new watch e-commerce, satisfying all the powers that be enough to get them to make the leap, and then you have a huge business: immediately in the order of magnitude of billions of dollars. It may not be time yet, but it will be soon, and someone is going to be there to take it to the bank.

So what would someone have to do to capture these markets? Well the press release from Chrono24 says that they are adding “Trusted Checkout” which is basically an escrow service to protect transactions. From the brief history of e-commerce, this strikes me as the exact wrong direction to go in. Of course it is a nice service, but it places a huge burden on the company and actually gives both seller and buyer another thing to worry about (I certainly would not sell under those conditions). Time and time again, it has been proven that the services that attract the most users are the ones that make it the absolute easiest to sign up and transact. This is something that is very difficult for the luxury watch industry to understand when moving online: KEEP IT SIMPLE. Many dealers and private sellers I know right now are selling more watches on Instagram than anywhere else, and this is not a coincidence.

But I am just a humble less-than-part-time blogger writing from my couch. Far be it from me to know how to spend Chrono24’s new mega bucks in the bank. What I do know is that the market is there. I wish the Chrono24 team the best of luck in grabbing it and can’t wait to see what they’ve got in store. Cheers!

Hodinkee Hires Kevin Rose and Raises $3.6 Million

This morning, Hodinkee announced that it has merged with Watchville, Kevin Rose’s app, that Kevin will now be CEO of Hodinkee, and that it has raised $3.6 million from a big time team of investors. If you follow this blog at all, you know I primarily write on watches and tech, so this post has me about as excited as could be.

First, let’s talk about the money. $3.6 million sounds like a nice, modest raise that will allow Hodinkee to function with enough working capital to make big moves and great hires (like hiring Jack Forster as managing editor), but isn’t so big that they give away too much control. The real story with the money, however, is who it came from. The list includes True Ventures, Google Ventures, Twitter founder Evan Williams, Basecamp’s Jason Fried, and Mr. John Mayer, yes THE John Mayer. Having this many brilliant, diversely well-connected people intimately involved with the project virtually guarantees it is going to move in an interesting direction and will have a major leg up in succeeding.

Having Kevin as CEO is certainly the most interesting part of the story. Kevin is a serial entrepreneur who is very well known in the tech industry and rose to fame in the first dot com era as the founder of Digg. I have long lamented about the incompetence and tone-deaf nature that is rampant in the watch industry, which makes Kevin a breath of fresh air. He is a young guy, and totally gets the 21st century 20s-40s successful male, while much of the industry is still shaping their businesses based on demographics and business models that became obsolete decades ago. I have been dying to see outsiders come into this industry to shape things up, and Kevin is right at the top.

So where do they go from here? Facebook took off because they bit off a niche of the market — college students — got full adoption there, then expanded outwards. Hodinkee represents a perfect niche to replicate this model. In a few short years, it has completely dominated the landscape of watch journalism and become a reference site even for those in other industries. It has also shown it can create revenue streams other than ads with huge sales of accessories and even retailing high end watches/clocks like the collaboration with my friends at MB&F. With Ben Clymer able to focus more on the content, and Jack Forster at the helm, I expect the content to continue to get even better. I am sure it is not lost on anyone involved that the models for selling new, used, and vintage watches are all broken. There is a tremendous market here for someone to take, and I would not be surprised to see things move in this direction. Then there are all of the different possible verticals. Gawker has Deadspin, Jezebel, etc. Hodinkee could easily expand into different verticals, becoming a huge media portal.

One thing is for certain, they are not playing around at this point. This is a big move. Kevin and this investor list would not be involved if they didn’t recognize the major opportunities here to become more than simply the best high end watch blog on the planet. Hodinkee just got on the rocket ride, and I cannot wait to see how high it can go.

Screw the Customer

Aside from watches, one of my other passions is contemporary art. There is a distinct form of art that offends me, however: art that makes fun of art collectors. Regrettably, this is not very uncommon. The main message communicated is usually some form of, “By the nature of you paying exorbitant sums for this, you prove that you are yuppy scum and I, oh great artist, am superior.” Perhaps this is inevitable in an industry where the creators often spend a large portion of their lives below the poverty line, and with any success the consumers are firmly in the 1%, but that reality makes it no less detestable to me.

The luxury watch industry is particularly vulnerable to a version of this mentality given the intrinsic uselessness of mechanical watches and their exorbitant prices. As the saying goes, “there’s a sucker born every day.” Sometimes I think this is the entire business model of some companies.

The question I get asked the most by watch-Muggles (that 99% of society who does not and will not ever understand why I pay $80,000 for a watch) is “What makes a watch worth $80,000?” Curiously, this is a question that we watch collectors very rarely ask ourselves. Perhaps ignorance is bliss and turning a blind eye to the absurdity of it all is necessary to the full enjoyment of the hobby. But there is a line, and sometimes it gets crossed, even by some of my favorite brands.

The newly released Richard Mille RM27-02 will run you a cool $800,000 (not a typo)

The newly released Richard Mille RM27-02 will run you a cool $800,000 (not a typo)

And so we cross the line from products to ethics. Capitalism, supply and demand, we are taught in business school that a firm can charge what the market will bear, with no judgments associated. I think this is wrong and short sighted. I believe that for the long term health of a company and the market as a whole, each product should be priced to provide as much value as possible to the buyer. It’s a simple concept actually: make the best product you can make and don’t fuck people over, even if they are complicit in it themselves and ultimately responsible for their own money.

And what of the media? We’ve read the same story countless times. “Watch X does such and such, is made of such and such, is really cool and a great achievement.” The last paragraph contains some astronomical price that is delivered with the dead pan of a congressional jobs report. Now, I am not naive. I understand the paradox of expecting outlets who are funded by the brands to be critical of their most indefensible crimes, but I do think that the stakes are higher than we think. Ultimately, these are not transactions in a vacuum. The pricing problem is the single biggest threat to the entire industry.

Over the last 15 years, average retail prices throughout the industry have consistently increased year over year, every few years discarding an entire “generation” of collectors. The sentiment expressed most often by the group of collectors I have known for the longest is that they are not interested in buying anymore, mainly due to pricing — not that they can’t afford what they want, but for those of us who are not new to the market, it is simply impossible to see the value at current prices.

There are some fantastic watches being made right now, and many have somewhat justifiable prices. One of my favorite posts on this blog is my thoughts on how to actually sell a $100,000 watch. I am not calling for an angry mob to burn the entire industry down. But when the most common question any sane person would ask is, “What makes watch Y worth $XXX,XXX,” I do think it is a point that we need to look at and have start the process of critical thinking toward. At least it would save me from having to spend an hour of my morning ranting on my blog.

How The Watch Industry Works (or doesn’t work)

On Tuesday night, I broke the news of the Patek Philippe price reductions. If you haven’t read that post, you should do so. It got me thinking that I’m not sure if most people understand the basic business of the watch business. For those of you who were TickTocking readers, you know that while I love watches, I can be fairly critical of the watch industry. I’ll do my best to explain how it works including the macro and micro economic factors I touched on in the Patek post, and where things break down.


Let’s start at the most basic: a watch brand makes and sells watches. That will be the starting point for this post. It is step 0 of the business, although much could be said about all of the steps leading up to this (planning, production, outsourcing, etc). The first critical point is that the retailer is the customer, not the collector who is reading this blog post. The brand sets a margin for the retailer, which is the percentage off from retail that he will buy for. For example, if a brand gives 50% margins, the dealer will pay $50,000 for a watch that retails for $100,000. The setting of this margin is certainly not an exact science. The general rule is that the stronger the brand, the less of a margin they give. This obviously makes sense if you look at the extreme case of a brand which is so strong that every piece they make will eventually sell at full retail price to a final customer without ever sitting in a showcase (the sale from the retailer to their buyer is often referred to as “sell through”). In this case, a retailer would be happy to pay $90,000 for a guaranteed $100,000 back with no risk. However, this is merely theoretical as there are always risk factors introduced by time and markets.

The retailers order for the year at the Basel and Geneva shows. This — not PR as it sometimes seems — is the purpose of those shows. Of course, throughout the year there are reorders and changes, but in general, the year’s purchases are laid out here. Each company has different policies regarding payments, but the important thing to know is that for any decent brand, the retailers buy their inventory. Here is where things often start to break down. The retailer then has pieces in the store and more always on the way. Ideally a consumer for each watch shows up within a reasonable period of time, the pieces sell through, and everything continues. Everyone is happy.


First let’s look at some issues from the brand point of view, then the retailer, then how those affect the consumer. By the time a new watch is shown in Basel, the brand has already invested a lot of money into it, millions of dollars if it is a new calibre. They have all of the production costs, marketing costs, administrative costs, etc. Not only do they ultimately need the revenue, but they need the cash flow that the retailers provide. Having orders in bulk from retailers, who while they sometimes get up to shady business, have better credit than the general public, allows brands to tailor their production and manage their cash flows in a way that depending on individual watch purchasers could not. However, this distances them from the eventual sales prices of their watches and sets up all of the problems of currency issues, discounting, gray market sales, etc. The brand wants every one of their watches sold at full retail price all over the world and for their secondary market prices to remain as high as possible.

The retailer has less overhead than a brand and also has a diversified portfolio consisting of many brands. So their incentives are not necessarily aligned with the brand itself. This opens the door for major politics between the brands and retailers. Amongst the brands, some are obviously much stronger than others and even within a brand there are pieces that are much more desirable than others. A retailer, who has to actually purchase his inventory, has to be smart about the brand mix in his store as well as the pieces he stocks from each brand. Having a Patek or Rolex authorized retailer agreement is like a license to print money for most stores, and don’t think that Patek and Rolex don’t know that and use it to their advantage. Everything from twisting arms about store layouts and display cases to forcing a dealer to buy a bunch of less desirable pieces in order to get the hot stuff is commonplace. The penalty for noncompliance is the brand will cease to deal with that retail store.

The game of tug-of-war between brand and retailer sometimes causes devastating effects. For example, in the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the big brands forced inventory down the retailers throats. After all, this is their revenue at stake. However, it left the retailers short of cash and without the ability to sell through. The immediate victims of this were the less powerful brands. With all the unwanted inventory from the big guys, retailers cancelled almost all their orders from smaller manufacturers. This killed some great projects and nearly killed some cool companies. I know of one example of a very large brand handing retailers their orders already printed out and chosen for them and forcing them to sign or lose their authorized dealer arrangement with that brand. One particular retailer who I know and respect more than most told that brand to get lost (or perhaps something a bit more vulgar) and ended a 20 year relationship with the brand.

If you’re paying attention, you can see all sorts of problems starting to form. Ultimately, if a watch isn’t produced, sold to a retailer and sold through to a final consumer at full (or very close to) retail price in a reasonable amount of time, someone is going to be unhappy.


Now let’s look at some economics. First, on a micro level, luxury products and particularly luxury watches do not exhibit the usual, smooth, downward sloping demand curve that we are all taught in school. Most products have more demand the cheaper they are and less as the price rises. Luxury watches are luxury products and they are made to last more or less forever, both of which serve to create fairly strange demand curves. I won’t get into all the phenomena here, but you see such things as high prices creating demand and lowering prices destroying it. This is part of what makes the Patek announcement so interesting. Lowering retail prices can actually serve to cave in demand. As collectors fear that the watches are less desirable or less stable they can flee to other brands, the vintage or secondary markets, or leave the market entirely. This drop in demand at retail can lead to an implosion when gray market forces begin to act.

The gray market is a pejorative term coined by retailers and brands (not necessarily in this industry) for the market of new watches that are not sold by an authorized dealer. It is supposed to conjure images of a black market of stolen goods. In actuality, the gray market is the system set up to bring economic efficiency to this otherwise economically unsound system. Brands set retail prices arbitrarily, attempt to price fix in the retail store by threatening to pull product if pieces are sold at discounts, push inventory on retailers that they know will not sell at full price, and often even produce pieces that no retailer will buy at normal cost prices. No one likes to sit on inventory, and eventually the pieces need to find their way to a buyer. So, both brands and retailers alike sell their extra inventory to gray market dealers, all the while cursing their business.

The gray market is also fueled by currency arbitrage. These are worldwide brands that generally export from Switzerland. At a macro economics level, brands try to keep their prices at parity across markets. However, this is nearly impossible to do when selling in multiple different currencies. What really makes it impossible is that as mentioned before, brands are much more reticent to decrease prices than they are to increase them. Something has to give, and again that slack is taken up by the gray market. When the EUR crashes, making Pateks in Europe considerably cheaper than the US, gray market dealers buy from European retailers and resell in the US. What’s the problem, you may ask? If tons of product is available on the gray market at well under retail prices and yet retailers are not allowed to discount, who is going to buy from the retailer? All of a sudden they are stuck with inventory which ultimately can lead to them blowing it out on the gray market and so these cycles can go nuclear very easily.

Of course, in addition to demand, we have to look at supply. This could be a post of its own, but it’s possible that over supply is the single main cause of all these problems. Mechanical watches are made to last virtually forever. Production year after year is cumulative. Currently, watches are being treated like fashion items. Every several months or every year, the new collection comes out making the old collection “obsolete” and driving the ever growing sales of the industry. But watches are not fashion items that wear old or depreciate to near zero. Year after year, millions of luxury watches are produced and they add to the tens of millions already in existence. You don’t have to be a mathematician to see the writing on the wall. It is an unsustainable machine running at full throttle with drivers who get paid based on their fastest lap time and not whether they finish the race or not. Quarterly revenues, yearly growth and ever expanding bottom lines are all that is confronted, even though it is clear that this will end badly.

What Does This Mean For The Consumer?

The ultimate effect on the consumer is higher prices and lower long term values. There are many mechanisms at play here, but I will highlight a few.

In order to continue to sell this many new watches each year, these companies have enormous marketing budgets. Ads, celebrity sponsorships, lavish events, all of these costs are eventually passed on to the consumer. It is one of the major reasons why average retail prices across the industry are so much higher than they were 15 years ago.

In addition, the retail model double charges consumers. In the past, retailers were not only points of sale, but marketing agents for their areas. They got such large margins and earned them because they brought new consumers to the brand and created sales. However, the world does not work like that any longer. Very few retailers are able to really market and sell their inventory. Instead, the brand shoulders all of that cost, but the retailer still takes a huge margin. How many of you would gladly pay 30-50% less for your watch and not deal with a retailer? My hand is raised. This has only recently become possible, but almost all retailer functions have become obsolete.

Stuck In The Past

My main complaint is that this entire system is archaic, hypocritical and ultimately hurts consumers. The model was developed generations ago, when a network of brick and mortar stores around the world was unmanageable for even the largest of companies and communication was mostly localized. Also brand managers were much more conscious of the long term health of the business, rather than being judged by quarterly performance numbers. Unfortunately, virtually no one is willing to adopt a different model. The biggest change is the shift to brand boutiques for the big brands, rather than multi-brand retailers. Controlled by the brand, they can control their sales and cut out most of the other stuff. However, even without having to pay the retailers margin they keep retail prices the same so as not to hurt other dealers, and it does not solve the problem of overproduction resulting in numbers of pieces that the market simply will not bear. The internet solves a lot of these problems, and while luxury brands have been very slow to embrace the 21st century, eventually they will have to. Ultimately, while it appears solid and sales numbers are incredibly high, the current system is actually hanging by a thread if you look at it in its entirety. I expect to see a lot of interesting changes in the coming years.

Patek Philippe Lowers Retail Prices as CHF explosion hits

I haven’t written in a while, but had to chime in here. Last month, the decision of the Swiss National Bank to unpeg the CHF from the EUR sent the CHF skyrocketing and left the watch industry in confusion. For an industry that almost hugely relies on exports from Switzerland, a sudden 20% increase in CHF is potentially devastating. It happened to come at a time when inventories are quite high, and new watch sales seem particularly slow as the market potentially (finally) nears saturation. Now we know how the most respected brand in the world, Patek Philippe, is going to deal with it.

In a letter (attached at the bottom of the post) from Thierry Stern, President, it was announced that Patek will be lowering retail prices in most markets, but raising them in EUR and JPN to attempt to reach parity around the world. In the US, retail prices will be lowered by 7%, a significant number when you figure the average retail price of a Patek Philippe is certainly over $50,000.

Lowering retail prices is an exceedingly uncommon move for luxury watch brands as it is feared that it calls into question the value of the product. Certainly at the very least it pisses off any customers who bought at the previous retail prices. Current collection Patek secondary market values have already been soft recently. Recently, I personally passed on a 5270G that was offered to me for $118,000 even though the same piece was selling for $140,000 not long ago.

It will be interesting to see how this affects the market for new Pateks as well as the vintage market. Also keep an eye on how the other brands deal with this situation, as it is a macroeconomic force that cannot be escaped.

Check out the original letter here:

Patek Letter

**unrelated note: perhaps I’m too used to the politically correct American media, but an American CEO would be absolutely shredded for that line about Asian tourists.

Lastly, here’s a quick video of my daily wearer Patek 3970: